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 THE IMPACT OF THE FLAT TAX REFORM ON INEQUALITY. 













In this paper we focused on the flat tax impact on inequality in Romania. We 
compared 2005 against 2004, when we were able to isolate the flat tax impact from 
other factors.  
 
We found that the higher the gross wage, the higher the flat tax gains. The inequality 
indicators we calculated (the Gini index, the relative mean deviation, the coeficient of 
variation, the standard deviation of logarithms, the Mehran index and the Piesch 
index) show an increase in inequality determined by the flat tax. The Lorenz curve is 
illustrative, as only the last quantile of the population (richest 20%) appears as the 
clear winner of the flat tax.  The results also indicate that the income elasticity of 
consumption is decreasing across quartiles, from 81 to 71 percent.  
 
We conclude that the flat tax led to increased income inequality and it stimulated 
households consumption particularly among the wealthiest households.  
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1.  Introduction and context, structure 
 
Flat tax is a proposal made by two American economists, Hall and Rabushka, in the 
early ‘80s, developing an idea originally launched by Milton Friedman. It is important 
to remark that their proposal, then and now (their seminal work was published in a 
revised edition in 2007), has been justified, in their view, by a particular feature of the 
existing US tax system: “(…) the shocking fact that over half of all business income 
never shows up in anyone’s adjusted income”
1. They want to replace the existing 
progressive tax system, which suffers from loopholes and deductions, with a single 
uniform tax rate for all income, applied only once – the flat tax. Nevertheless, the flat 
tax “(...) is progressive where it counts most: for the poor”
2, in the sense that it would 
come with an exemption for incomes below a certain threshold. In fact, this means 
that there are two tax rates: 0, for all income below a threshold
3, and another rate
4 for 
all the other incomes. Insulating the poorest from taxation is probably a trade-off for 
accepting what the authors acknowledge to be “(…) a tremendous boon to the 
economic elite”
5. In a revenue-neutral scenario, there are winners and losers of a flat 
tax reform; if the poorest are exempted, and the richest are definitely better-off, the 
tax burden moves upon the middle class.  
 
While levied on income, the flat tax is actually considered a consumption tax as it 
removes all new investment from the tax base – at least in Hall and Rabushka’s view. 
From this perspective, a consumption tax should lead to less consumption, therefore 
creating “incentives to save and invest”
6. Flat tax, as originally proposed, should have 
stimulated the supply side of the economy. Evidence shows that in countries where 
the flat tax has been introduced this condition was not met, as all new investments 
were not exempted from the tax base.  
 
Flat tax was not introduced in the US – except for a number of six federal states, but it 
has become increasingly fashionable in Eastern Europe. Estonia was first to introduce 
it in 1994, followed by the other two Baltic states, then by Russia in 2001, Serbia in 
2003, Slovak Republic and Ukraine in 2004, Romania and Georgia in 2005. Some 
countries maintained different income and corporate tax rates, so the flat tax refered in 
most cases to income tax only; the latter varies from 12% in Ukraine to 33% in 
Lithuania and even 37.5% in Iceland. Except for Latvia and Georgia, the introduction 
of flat taxes was associated with an increase in personal allowances. In 2007 more 
countries introduced the flat tax: Macedonia, Montenegro, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, followed in 2008 by Albania and Bulgaria (a 10% rate), as well as by the 
Czech Republic. As of 2008, 24 countries have reported flat taxes
7, among which Iraq 
– an example of how the flat tax idea has been exported before being tested. 
 
It is noteworthy that in Hall and Rabushka’s proposal there is nothing which goes 
beyond the US tax system. In fact, the flat tax systems introduced in Eastern Europe 
have little in common with the original idea, as none of them meets all the additional 
                                                 
1 Hall and Rabushka (2007), pp.142 
2 Hall and Rabushka (1985), pp.466 
3 The threshold they propose for US is 22,500 USD annualy 
4 They propose a 19% rate. 
5 Idem 1, pp.152 
6 Idem 4, pp.63 
7 According to the US-based Center for Freedom and Prosperity   3
requirements needed for an “orthodox” flat tax (as proposed by Hall and Rabushka), 
namely: no tax on savings (including pensions), no tax on foreign earnings, no tax on 
capital gains, no tax on inheritances, no tax on charities, no allowances and reliefs, 
and business being taxed on cash flow, not on profits (Murphy, 2006). The level of 
conformity with the original flat tax proposal varies from country to country; Slovak 
Republic comes closest, as it introduced the same flat tax rate for labour, income and 
consumption (VAT)
8. Since the flat taxes introduced in Eastern Europe do not have 
many of the characteristics of the “orthodox” flat tax, it is doubtful whether the 
original arguments in favor of a flat tax (as controversial as they are) could still apply 
in these cases.  
 
The main argument in favour of the flat tax is its simplicity and efficiency; one tax 
rate is easier to understand by tax payers and easier to administer by tax authorities. 
Hall and Rabushka (2007) consider that there is a virtual consensus on this issue. Flat 
tax supporters invoke this argument very often
9. However, McCaleb (1985) questions 
the superior efficiency of the flat tax, saying that one should not ignore the 
interdependence between tax rules and spending decisions. 
 
A strong argument of flat tax enthusiasts is that it increases the incentives to work, by 
decreasing the marginal effective tax rate. Caprirolo (2006) and Heineken (2006) hold 
it true based on simulations for Slovenia, respectively Netherland. But Theather 
(2005) mentions a number of instances in which the wage supply might be inelastic to 
a change in tax rates, such as: minimum wages are set by government, not by market; 
higher-paid people already work at their full capacity; the structure of employment 
contracts limits the elasticity of labour supply. 
 
Another major argument of the flat tax proponents is that it would help improve tax 
collection by lowering tax evasion and broadening the tax base, hence increasing the 
budget revenues. Evidence so far is mixed, at best. Keen, Kim and Varsano (2006) 
show that, in the first year after the introduction of a flat tax, budget revenues from 
personal income tax (as a share in GDP) dropped in Estonia, Georgia, Romania, 
Slovak Republic and Ukraine, while they increased in Latvia, Lithuania and Russia. 
For Latvia and Lithuania the explanation is that in these countries the flat tax rate was 
set at the highest marginal tax rate prior to reform (which is, in fact, quite contrary to 
the flat tax logic). For Russia, an econometric study by Ivanova, Keen and Klemm 
(2005) concludes that the strong increase in revenues from the income tax can not be 
attributed to the flat tax, but to an increase in real wages unrelated to the flat tax 
reform.  
 
Regarding Slovak Republic, Golias and Kicina (2005) present detailed data on budget 
revenues in the first year of the flat tax. Revenues from personal income tax and from 
corporate income tax decreased significantly, as a share in total revenues, from 18.3% 
to 14.6%, respectively from 15.4% to 12.5%; moreover, they also decreased in 
nominal terms. These losses were more than compensated by the increase in VAT 
revenues (as a share in total revenues) from 41.9% to 44.9%; overall, the budget 
revenues increased by 7.4% in nominal terms. A similar situation happened in 
Romania in 2005, the first year when a 16% flat tax on income and profit was 
                                                 
8 Incidentally, the flat tax rate was set at 19%. 
9 See, among others, Grecu (2004), Vanasaun (2006), Krajcir (2006)   4
introduced. Revenues from personal tax income and corporate tax income decreased 
in real terms (while slightly increasing in nominal terms, though), but these losses 
were balanced by the large increase in VAT revenues. In the following years, the 
revenues from personal income tax and corporate income tax recovered in real terms, 
but only after a series of tax levels was raised; for example, the tax on dividends 
increased from 5% to 16%, the tax on capital gains increased from 1% to 16%, and 
the tax on interest gains increased from 1% to 16%. Based on this data, it is hard to 
say that the Slovak and the Romanian economy got a supply side kick; rather the 
opposite, they got a demand side kick. This demand side stimulus was quite obvious 
in Romania, as the current account deficit increased from 8.5% in 2004 (the year 
before the flat tax reform) to 13.9% in 2007, and the budget deficit increased from 
1.3% in 2004 to 2.7% in 2007 and 5.2% in 2008. However, there are other factors 
apart from the flat tax that might explain these developments: wage increases 
unrelated to the flat tax reform, past years of repressed consumption, a strong 
currency appreciation, a boom of household loans, and an increased pressure on the 
public expenditures side due to EU integration.  
 
Even though the success of the flat tax has not been proved in terms of increasing the 
budget revenues, some countries continue to join the flat tax bandwagon. Murphy 
(2006) provides a plausible explanation, when he holds that the flat tax is a political 
objective, not a taxation policy. Keen, Kim and Varsano (2006) also believe that the 
main rationale for the flat tax is the area of marketing, as a sign to the world of a 
fundamental regime change; it is quite often, actually, that the flat tax reform 
followed a radical change in government, as it was the case, among others, for Russia, 
Georgia, Ukraine and Romania. 
 
In this paper we will try to answer two research questions related to the flat tax impact 
on inequality in Romania. First, what were the distributional gains and losses from the 
flat tax reform? And second, was the extra disposable income consumed or saved? 
We do not, however, adopt a normative approach towards the issue of the flat tax 
reform; neither do we address its macroeconomic implications. 
 
2. Literature review on the flat tax impact on inequality 
 
The international literature on the flat tax impact on inequality is not vast. Most 
studies are in fact simulations, based on a budget revenue neutrality assumption. They 
were made in countries which did not implement the flat tax, but were contemplating 
it. Few of these studies estimate that flat tax can reduce inequality. Davies and Hoy 
(2002) calculate, for US, that the introduction of a flat tax could reduce inequality, if 
the tax rate is not set too high. Davies, Hoy and Linch (2003) hold that, for Canada, a 
flat tax reform would reduce inequality for all family types if complemented by tax 
base broadening; for flat tax without base broadening, they calculate the tax rate that 
would be inequality-neutral. Ironically, this rate is quite high (over 40% for Canada), 
which contradicts their previous finding for US. Hall and Rabushka (2007) forecast 
that the introduction of a flat tax in US would lower tax burden on both low earners 
and high earners, at the expense of middle class; they do not calculate, however, any 
inequality measure per se.  
 
Most of these studies suggest that flat tax would lead to increased inequality. Dunbar 
and Pogue (1998) find, for US, that switching to the flat tax would increase the tax   5
burden for most taxpayers, while it would significantly redistribute tax burdens, 
mainly from the top decile to other taxpayers. Ventura (1999), in an estimation based 
on US data as well, calculates that the introduction of a flat tax would contribute to 
higher concentration of income and wealth; income Gini would increase from 0.43 to 
0.46, and wealth Gini would increase from 0.60 to 0.68. Murphy (2006), after a 
simulation exercise of introducing a flat tax (even with a high threshold for tax 
exempted income) using UK data, summarizes the results in a paradox: flat tax is not 
progressive enough to prevent the system as a whole to become regressive.  
 
Peichl (2006) simulates the effects of a potential introduction of a 30% flat tax rate in 
Germany. He finds that the flat tax increases inequality (the Gini index increases by 
2.56 percentage points). In this scenario, the first decile (poorest people) would 
neither gain nor lose, the second and third deciles would gain just a little (an increase 
in net wage by 0.08%, respectively 0.28%), the other deciles up to the nineth would 
lose from the flat tax (largest losses for the seventh decile, by 1.1%), while the large 
winner would be the tenth decile (richest people), gaining 5.87% to their net wage. 
Nevertheless, polarization slightly decreases (by 0.47%), due to the higher 
homogeneity between the poorest deciles and the middle deciles (the latter’s losses 
bring them closer to the poorest deciles).  
 
Gonzales-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006) make a similar simulation for Spain. 
They find that the introduction of a flat tax would raise inequality significantly: the 
Gini index for wages would increase from 0.31 to 0.35, and the Gini index for 
earnings would increase from 0.34 to 0.37. Different to the results for Germany or 
US, the first two quintiles would lose, the third quintile would stagnate, and the last 
two quintiles (richest 40% of population) would gain.  
 
Larsen (2006) calculates the impact of a flat tax for Denmark, in various revenue-
neutral scenarios. A flat tax rate of 35.2% without any personal allowances would 
create huge inequalities, as the first decile (poorest people) would pay higher taxes by 
70%, while the tenth decile (richest people) would pay less taxes by more than 20%. 
The second and the third decile would also pay higher taxes by 30%, respectively 
20%; first seven deciles are clear losers of the system, the eight decile is not affected, 
and the last two deciles are winners. Another two scenarios test the effect of higher 
flat tax rates combined with personal allowances.  In these scenarios, the first decile 
has a little to gain (about 3% less in taxes), the next five deciles lose (paying up to 
20% more taxes), the seventh and the eight deciles are not affected, and the last two 
deciles win by a lesser margin (5% to 15%). The author concludes that in the short 
run a revenue neutral flat tax would have unacceptable distributional effects. 
 
Caprirolo (2006) tests various scenarios for the introduction of a revenue-neutral 20% 
flat tax rate in Slovenia. Under an unchanged gross wage, the net wage of low skilled 
workers would decrease, and the net wage of high skilled workers would increase, 
therefore increasing inequality. He also finds that, while the total tax burden slightly 
decreases, it would shift towards the individuals earning up to the average gross wage. 
After the flat tax reform,  the tax burden would increase for 70% of the workforce, but 
it would decrease significantly for a minority of employees earning (before the 
reform) more than three times the average gross wage.  
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The World Bank (2005) calculated the actual impact of the flat tax in Slovakia (where 
flat tax was implemented in 2004). In our opinion, the overall results are influenced 
by the fact that 2004 (the first year after reform) is compared against 2002 (which was 
not the last year before the reform); this might yield results attributable to other causes 
than the flat tax itself. Moreover, flat tax reform was complemented by the 
simultaneous unification of VAT rates and the reform of the benefits system. When 
taking them altogether, the resulting fiscal system seems slightly more progressive 
and redistributional than before: the Gini index is unchanged, and the Kakwani 
progressivity index increases. According to the World Bank, all deciles of population 
benefited from the reform. Only smaller groups of people were worst off, mainly 
households with three or more children where all adults are unemployed - these are 
probably the poorest households. However, when flat tax impact is singled out, the 
study shows that the Kakwani index almost halved (from 0.11 to 0.06); a decrease in 
the index signals an increase in polarization.  
 
Also for Slovakia, Krajcir (2006) finds that in the first year after the introduction of 
the flat tax, the real disposable income increased by 3.1% for the individuals earning 
minimum wage, by 0.9% for the individuals earning the average wage, and by 8.9% 
for individuals earning three times the average wage. Gonzales-Torrabadella and 
Pijoan-Mas (2006) find, based on simulations for Spain, that the last quintile (richest 
people) is most stimulated to consume more by a flat tax; consumption grows by up to 
20% for this category of population, while it also grows by smaller margins for the 
rest of the population.  
 
To summarize the literature on the impact of the flat tax, one could say that most 
studies estimate an increase of inequality. There are few studies on the consumption 
behaviour after a flat tax reform; one could expect more consumption, but there is no 
evidence so far on the elasticity of consumption. Most of these studies, however, are 
simulations. Our analysis, on the other hand, would draw on the actual data for 
Romania, before and after the 2005 flat tax reform.  
 
 
3. Statistical analysis 
 
Our research is based on the 2004 and 2005 waves of the yearly Households Budget 
Survey (HBS) run by Romania’s National Statistics Institute. The HBS samples about 
3,000 households a month, resulting in more than 33,000 households surveyed in each 
year (33,195 in 2004 and 33,066 in 2005). Every household member over 15 years old 
is interviewed and data on personal characteristics (occupational status, education, 
etc) and income (all net income sources and all taxes and contributions paid) is 
recorded. In 2005, 99,414 individuals were surveyed (out of which only 20,777 
earned a salary), compared to 101,692 individuals (20,759 salary-earners) in 2004. 
The household head is the member that earns most. At household level, geographical 
characteristics (county, urban/rural area) and consumption expenditures are recorded. 
The consumption expenditures are recorded for each good purchased, which enables 
us to distinguish between durable and non-durable goods. 
 
In 2004, before the flat tax reform, a gradual labour income taxation system was in 
place, with rates ranging from 18 to 40 percent, applicable on the monthly taxable 
income (i.e. gross wage less health and social insurance contributions). In addition to   7
this, a non-taxable allowance was granted: for an employee with no dependants, the 
amount was 210 RON, increasing by 50% for each additional dependant. 
 
Table 1. Personal income tax, 2004 
Monthly Taxable Income  Tax 
Up to 251.6 RON  18% 
From to 251.3 to 608.3 RON  45.3 RON + 23% of what exceeds 251.3 RON 
From to 608.3 to 975 RON  127.3 RON + 28% of what exceeds 608.3 RON 
From to 975 to 1362.5 RON  230 RON + 34% of what exceeds 975 RON 
Over 1362.5 RON  361.8 RON + 40% of what exceeds 975 RON 
 
On January 1
st, 2005 a flat tax reform was introduced. The flat tax rate was set at 
16%, applicable on the monthly gross wage. In addition to that, the non-taxable 
allowance was increased, ranging from 250 RON for individuals with no dependants 
to 650 RON for individuals with four or more dependants (the allowance increases by 
100 RON with each additional dependant, flattening at 650 RON). However, this 
allowance was not granted to all employees: those with a salary below 1000 RON 
were entitled to a full allowance, then for wages between 1000 and 3000 RON the 
allowance decreased linearly, bottoming at zero (no allowance) for those earning 3000 
RON or more.  
 
According to HBS, salaries represented 43.7% of the total net monthly income earned 
by household members in 2005; hence changes in salary tax had the most important 
distributional effects.  Pensions, the second ranked source of income (18.2%), were 
not affected by the flat tax reform in 2005 (although pensions would be taxed starting 
from 2006). An important change introduced by the flat tax reform from an individual 
point of view was the increase of the dividend tax, from 5% in 2004 to 10% in 2005 
and 16% in 2006. However, as dividends account for less than 4% of the total family 
income, one could submit that its distributional effects were negligible. Moreover, for 
small companies where firm management and ownership were the same, under the 
flat tax it became more effective to increase wages than to pay dividends. From 2006 
onwards, other personal taxes increased, such as the tax on interest gains and on 
capital gains (both increased from 1% to 16%) – but their cumulated share in total 
income is less than 1%. Furthermore, as these changes were introduced in 2006, we 
are not covering them in this paper. Instead, we compare 2005 against 2004 data, and 
try to isolate the impact of the flat tax.  
 
3.1. The distributional effect of the flat tax 
 
The first question we attempt to answer in this paper is what were the distributional 
gains and losses from the flat tax reform.  
 
Figure 1 shows the differences in the taxes paid under the proportional and the flat tax 
system for gross wages between the minimum wage (280 RON in 2005) and the 
maximum wage in the HBS (5500 RON). One can remark that:  
(a) the higher the gross income, the higher the gains from the flat tax system, and  
(b) the gains from the flat tax system are decreasing with the number of dependants.  
 
The fact that for the same gross income those with more dependants gained less is 
explained by the decrease in allowance for those earning more then 1000 RON. 
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The effects of the flat tax reform on net labour income were therefore propagated via 
two channels: first, the flat tax (16%) replaced the progressive one (between 18 and 
40%), and second, the personal allowance became a decreasing function of the gross 
wage (flat up to 1000 RON, linearly decreasing up to 3000 RON, nothing above this 
amount). In Figure 2, we single out the effect of first channel, by assuming the 
allowance system was the same in 2005 and 2004, so the only effect comes from the 
implementation of the 16% flat tax. We notice that the gains are generally higher, and 
the dispersion caused by the number of dependants is lower. However, for the same 
gross wage, the gains are again decreasing as the number of dependants increase. The 
explanation is that an increase in the number of dependants, hence an increase in 
allowance, diminishes the average tax rate to significant extent under the progressive 
scheme. Under the flat scheme, both the average and the marginal tax rates are 
constant. Hence, the change in the average tax rate is smaller the higher the number of 
dependants, so the gains are smaller as well. 
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Figure 3 plots the gains under a 16% labour income tax with the 2005 regressive 
allowance against the gains obtained by keeping the same allowance system as in 
2004 (flat allowance).  
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So far we have focused on the theoretical gains following the implementation of the 
flat tax reform. We saw that, due to the higher allowance, nobody losses in absolute 
terms, and that the gains are increasing with wages.  
 
However, looking at the distribution of gross salary income in Figure 4 and Table 2, 
we see that 75 percent of the employees surveyed earn less than 868 RON per month. 
From the theoretical gains plotted in Figure 1 (or the detailed Figure 1 in the Annex), 
it follows that the maximum gain for these employees is around 30 RON (for an 
individual with no dependants). 
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Table 2: The distribution of gross salary income, 2005 
 
Percentiles  P/L        Smallest 
 1%          302         278.08 
 5%          310          278.5 
10%          313            279       Obs               13793 
25%       426.81            280       Sum of Wgt.       13793 
50%          600                      Mean           724.0804 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      454.0788 
75%        867.5           5050 
90%         1224        5415.01       Variance       206187.6 
95%         1555           6200       Skewness       3.001604 
99%         2412        7400.34       Kurtosis       20.39903 
 
 
In order to assess the empirical distribution of gains from the flat tax reform, we first 
double-checked the data. We looked at the salary income and taxes paid in 2005 and 
asked ourselves: how much would this employee have paid in taxed under to 2004 
labour income tax regime? Because we only have data on taxes paid, but not on the 
number of dependants, we tried to compute this number by looking at the amount paid 
in taxes. By dividing the effective labour income tax paid by 0.16, we get the taxable 
base. The “empirical” allowance is computed as the difference between the net 
income plus the effective labour income tax paid and the taxable base. Then, from the 
gross wage, the “theoretical” allowance is computed for all possible number of 
dependants. Then we look for what number of dependants do the “empirical” and 
“theoretical” allowance match (± 10 RON). The rest of employees, we assume, had 
incorrectly reported their earnings or taxed paid, so we dropped them from the 
sample. This way we have a sample of 13,816 wage earners (out of 20,777) for which 
we can accurately compute the gains from the flat tax reform. 
 
Table 3 shows these gains were rather small: the average gain was 25 RON, with 90 
percent of the workers earning less than 50 RON (see Figure 5). The fact that the 
average gain is almost twice the median (13.2 RON) shows how skewed to the right 
the distribution of gains is: 10 percent of the employees amassed 40 percent of the 
gains. In relative terms, the gain for the average worker was 3.73% of his/her net 
wage, while only around 2 percent of the employees gained more than 10 percent (see 
Figure 6). 
 
Table 3: Empirical profit/loss (P/L) from flat tax, 2005 
 
Percentiles P/L     Smallest     
 1%         5.58        -106.96 
 5%         8.82        -106.92 
10%     9.238401        -106.92       Obs               13816 
25%        10.44        -106.82       Sum of Wgt.       13816 
50%         13.2                      Mean           25.30547 
                        Largest    Std. Dev.      37.68452 
75%      27.6201         591.16 
90%     49.96001       663.8301       Variance       1420.123 
95%        75.09          820.6       Skewness       7.469597 
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Our conclusion that the gains from the flat tax reform were unequally distributed, 
hence aggravating the existing inequality, is emphasized when we look at broader 
inequality measures like the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient for the gross labour 
income was 29.26% in 2005, compared to 28.38% in 2004 (see Table 4). One might 
argue that the increase is only one percentage point in absolute terms (or three 
percentes in relative terms), which does not seem very worrying. Nevertheless, this 
increase in the Gini index took place in only one year, and it refers to total labour 
income; the impact of the flat tax on total labour income might have been 
compensated by wage increases (unrelated to the flat tax), by a slightly lower level of 
social contributions, or by a higher level of personal allowances. 
 
We look then at the inequality of the distribution of the flat tax gains themselves. If 
the flat tax is really flat, then the gains inequality should be the same as the wage 
inequality. But the Gini for the flat tax gains was substantially higher, at 49.22%. A 
higher Gini for the flat tax gains implies that the flat tax reform generated more 
inequality.  
 
Moreover, when we calculate inequality measures for 2006, based on the same 
Households Survey, we remark that these have not changed significantly compared to 
2005. Gini, for example, has exactly the same value. This means that the surge in the   12
Gini index in 2005 against 2004 was determined by the flat tax reform (which was 
introduced on January 1st, 2005), a factor which was not replicated in 2006.  
 
Table 4: Inequality measures 






















.48228888 .49844337 .73306533  .49646259 
 
Gini coefficient  .28384865  .2925929  .49217524  .29226494 
Mehran  measure  .37555264 .38830901 .60300479  .387894 
Piesch  measure  .23799663 .24473485 .43676052  .24445044 
Kakwani  measure  .07332774 .07724796 .2249182  .07717882 
Theil entropy 
measure 
.14322329 .14962984 .50081085  .15049996 
 
The relative mean deviation (RMD) is a simple measure of inequality, showing the 
proportion of income that would need to be transferred from those above mean to 
those below mean to achieve equality. The interpretation is RMD is that the higher the 
RMD, the higher the inequality. Flat tax largely increased RMD, which points 
towards increasing inequality.  
 
The coefficient of variation is another inequality measure that meets the Pigou-Dalton 
condition that an inequality index decreases whenever income is transferred from a 
richer individual to a poorer individual. The coefficient of variation is more than 
double for flat tax profit/loss, which also indicates more inequality. Standard 




Figure 7. Lorenz curve from the flat tax reform 
 
 
The Gini coefficient is a weighted average of the Mehran and Piesch indexes, and 
they are all three Lorenz-based measures. Gini is defined as the ratio of twice the area   13
between the Lorenz curve and the 45 degree line to the area of the box as a whole. 
The Mehran measure is most affected by those with low incomes, while the Piesch 
measure is most affected by those with high incomes. Both the Mehran and the Piesch 
indexes show increased inequality after the flat tax introduction. The Lorenz curve is 
very illustrative for the fact that the last quintile of the population was better off due 
to the flat taxe (see Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Difference between the Lorenz curves, before and after the flat tax reform 




The Kakwani index seems to indicate progressivity, in the sense that the concentration 
of taxes distribution is higher than the concentration of income distribution. However, 
this is an in-built result for a flat tax reform (concentration of taxes is very high for a 
flat tax – actually, it would have been equal to 1 in the absence of allowances). With 




3.2. The flat tax impact on the consumption and savings behaviour 
 
Our second research question is whether the extra disposable income was consumed 
or saved. To this end, (a) we look at the elasticity of consumption for those families 
who gained from the reform compared to those who did not, and (b) we test the 
hypothesis that the income elasticity of consumption is increasing with flat tax gains. 
If the income elasticity of consumption in the top quartile of the flat tax gains 
distribution is higher than in the bottom quartile, one could assume that the extra 
income was consumed. 
 
Our data source registers consumption and savings per families, so we have to 
aggregate the gains from the flat tax reform. Moreover, sampling weights are 
provided at family level, but not at individual level. Keeping only those families for 
which at least one worker was included in the sample used above (those workers for 
which we were able to back up the number of dependants), our sample includes 9884 
families. Table 5 shows that the average family gained 36.1 RON in 2005 from the 
flat tax reform, while the median gain was 21.6 RON.  
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The empirical distribution of gains per family, as a function of total gross salary 
income, is shown in Figure 7. As the flat tax gains depend not only on the gross 
income, but also on the number of dependants per family, the elasticity estimates have 
to be a function of these two variables.  
 
Table 5:  Profit and loss (PnL) from the flat tax, per family per month 
 
Percentiles   PnL_FT_fam   Smallest 
 1%         5.688001          -65.24 
 5%         8.838001           -58.64 
10%           9.44         -52.1764         Obs                9884 
25%           11.379             -47.33609         Sum of Wgt.  2591831.24 
50%          21.66                          Mean           36.11603 
                              Largest         Std. Dev.      51.91648 
75%         40.00881             794 
90%         72.14001            820.6         Variance        2695.32 
95%         112.13         1047.885         Skewness       6.582792 
99%           263.32         1115.395         Kurtosis        77.7014 
 
Figure 7: Flat tax gains and total labour income, per family per month 
 
 
An interesting fact is that there were a few losing families (0.6% of the sample), 
probably because of the regressive allowances, on the one hand, and of the limited 
maximum level of the allowances, on the other hand. 
 
A typical winning family is in the top 25% of the net labour income distribution. It 
has the following characteristics: 76% completed at least the high-school (34% have a 
university degree), 83.5% live in the urban area, 35.8% have three members, 48% 
have no dependants (from a tax point of view), and – most important- the average 
family income was 1787 RON, which was three times the average salary (in 2005). 
 
The average 2005 flat tax gain, consumption expenditures (defined as the 
expenditures on food and agricultural products, non-food items and services), and net 
income are computed for these groups and shown in Table 6 (the “winners” are in the 
top half of the flat tax gains distibution, while the “non-winners” are in the bottom 
half).  
 
Table 6. FT gains, Consumption, and Net Income in 2005 
 




Net Income  








0 73.9  21.1  1414.3  697.5  1797.1  713.9 
1 52.0  17.3  1378.9  713.4  1653.0  737.9 
2 44.7  14.8  1350.4  752.5  1629.3  745.9 
3 22.5  11.4  1142.5  652.4  1415.7  674.1 
4+ 17.1  10.3  1152.1  657.5  1271.9  667.1 
Overall 55.0  17.2 1365.3 709.9  1671.1  724.7 
No 
borrowing  52.7 16.7  1354.0  690.5  1592.6  686.5 
 
Consistently with the theoretical flat-tax gains depicted in Figure 1, the empirical 
gains decrease with the number of dependants. Overall, the flat tax gains represent 
about 3.3 percent of the total net income for the “winning” families, and 2.4 percent 
for the “non-winning” ones. As far as consumption is concerned, on average, it 
represents 82 and 98 percent o total income for “winning” and “non-winning” 
families, respectively.  
 
As food and other necessity goods with low income elasticity constitute a large share 
of consumption, the data shows that the consumption share of income decreases with 
income, as expected. As a function of the number of dependants, the consumption 
share of income increases up to two dependants, then decreases for families with three 
and four dependants (which make up only 9.6 percent of the sample, though).   
 



















1 425 100.70%  0  3592 
          
1,227.00   91.20% 
2 745.3  95.70%  1  3642  1134.5  92.30% 
3 1136  88.80%  2  1913  1075  93.30% 
4 2209.8  82.50%  3  532  806  91% 
     4+ 205  666.5  93.10% 
 
Since we lack panel data, a comparison with the 2004 wave needs to rest on the 
assumption that there is no net income mobility between large groups. More precisely, 
we assume that the “winning” families were in the same percentile of the net income 
distribution in 2004 as in 2005 (the top half), for the same number of dependants. 
Table 7 compares the net income threshold (i.e. the median income) for 2004 and 
2005, across the number of dependants. The largest increase in net income occurs for 
families with three or more dependants, which have the least to gain from the flat tax 
in absolute terms. On average, the flat tax gains contributed a modest 2.4 percent to 
the increase in the net income for the median family. 
 











flat tax gain 
2005 (RON) 
Flat tax gain  
as % of 2004 income 
0 1064  992  7.3%  28.41  2.9% 
1 1057  926  14.1%  22.4 2.4% 
2 1053  872  20.8%  19  2.2%   16
3 953  773  23.3%  11.4 1.5% 
4+ 903  746  21.0%  10.33 1.4% 
Overall 1045  917  14.0%  21.66  2.4% 
No borrowing  1005  893  12.5%  20.88  2.35% 
 
A first attempt at estimating the marginal propensity to consume is by looking at the 
changes in consumption and income across quartiles of the income distribution, 
between 2004 and 2005. This assumes that (a) little income mobility occurred during 
the period, hence the families in a certain quartile in 2004 were in the same quartile in 
2005 as well, and (b) the breakdown by income quartile is highly correlated with the 
gains from the flat tax reform. While the first assuption cannot be tested in the 
absence of panel data, the second one can be established by looking at Figure 7: flat 
tax gains are increasing in net salary income.  
 
To test how accurateley we can predict the flat tax gains quartile based on the net 
salary income quartile, we use a principal discriminant analysis. This analysis is run 
around the three quartile points (25, 50, and 75 percentile) and will show how many 
observations of the respective income group (above/below the income threshold) are 
correctly classified in the same flat tax gain group (above/below the flat tax gain 
threshold). Even though the FT gains are linear in income, there are many practical 
reasons why the prediction accuracy is less than 100 percent, the most important 
being that FT gains are also a function of the number of dependants, as shown in 
Figure 1. Besides, it is likely that either the salary income or the taxes paid are 
sometimes not rigourously reported. The results are shown in Table 8: 
 
Table 8. Flat tax gains prediction, by income quartiles 
Bottom quartile 
 
                     ----- Predicted FT Grp ----- 
            IncomeGrp|  Above 25%    Below 25%  |   Total 
            ---------+--------------------------+-------- 
            Above 25%|     5183          2231   |    7414 
            Below 25%|      665          1805   |    2470 
            ---------+--------------------------+-------- 
            Total    |     5848          4036   |    9884 
            ---------+--------------------------+-------- 
                                                   
                    Correctly predicted =  70.70 % 
                    Model sensitivity   =  69.91 % 
                    Model specificity   =  73.08 % 
                    False positive      =  11.37 % 
                    False negative      =  55.28 % 
 
Median quartile 
                     ----- Predicted FT Grp ----- 
            IncomeGrp|  Above 50%   Below 50%   |   Total 
            ---------+--------------------------+-------- 
            Above 50%|     3317          1628   |    4945 
            Below 50%|      933          4006   |    4939 
            ---------+--------------------------+-------- 
            Total    |     4250          5634   |    9884 
            ---------+--------------------------+-------- 
                                                   
                    Correctly predicted =  74.09 % 
                    Model sensitivity   =  67.08 % 
                    Model specificity   =  81.11 % 
                    False positive      =  21.95 % 
                    False negative      =  28.90 %   17
 
Top quartile 
                      ----- Predicted FT Grp ---- 
            Actual   |  Above 75%   Below 75%   |   Total 
            ---------+--------------------------+-------- 
            Above 75%|     1725           746   |    2471 
            Below 75%|      999          6414   |    7413 
            ---------+--------------------------+-------- 
            Total    |     2724          7160   |    9884 
            ---------+--------------------------+-------- 
                                                   
                    Correctly predicted =  82.35 % 
                    Model sensitivity   =  69.81 % 
                    Model specificity   =  86.52 % 
                    False positive      =  36.67 % 
                    False negative      =  10.42 % 
 
The prediction accuracy varies between 70.7 and 82.35 percent, the prediction 
becoming more accurate as the flat tax gains increase. To give an example how the 
prediction accuracy is calculated, we can look at the analysis aroud the median: out of 
4,945 households with an income above median, 3,317 are correctly predicted to have 
a flat tax gain above the median. Also, out of 4,939 households with an income below 
the median, 4,006 have a flat tax gain also below the median. Therefore, the 
prediction accuracy is (3317+4006)/(4945+4939)=0.741.  
To compute the marginal propensity to consume (MPC), we use the average 
family consumption (chelt_cons) and net income (venit_net) in RON across quartile, 
for 2004 and 2005: 
 
Table 9: Marginal propensity to consume, by income quartiles 
Quartile Variable  2004  2005  %  Change  Elasticity 
1 chelt_cons  483.3124  574.2201  18.8%  82.3% 
 venit_net  453.6966  557.4431  22.9%  - 
2 chelt_cons  688.9238  845.8292  22.8%  109.8% 
 venit_net  739.1441  892.4057  20.7%  - 
3 chelt_cons  925.3501  1084.129  17.2%  87.9% 
 venit_net  1032.54  1234.017  19.5%  - 
4 chelt_cons  1450.807  1646.367  13.5%  81.2% 
 venit_net  1807.869  2108.071  16.6%  - 
 
It is apparent that the (unconditional) income elasticity of consumption decreases with 
income, for the second, third, and fourth quartile. A possible reason for the lower 
income elasticity is the underreporting of income levels at the bottom of the income 
distribution, a problem highlighted by many authors (see Butelmann and Gallergo 
(2001) for Chile, or Denizer et al. (2002) for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland). Another 
way of looking at the income elasticity of consumption elasticity is to obtain estimates 
conditional on household characteristics like number of dependants (pintr_fam), 
rural/urbal area (mediu, coded as rural=0, urban=1), education (dummy variables 
edu2 and edu3, reflecting high-school and university educated head of households, 
respectively)  and age of head (varsta) and its square (varsta2). To this end, we regress 
the log of consumption expenditure on the log of net income (lvenit_net and 
lchelt_cons, respectively) and the other explanatory variables for each income 
quartile, for 2005 (the results are shown in Table 10). Since income and consumption 
are in logs, the coefficient on log income can be interpreted as elasticity.  
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Table 10. Robust regression, dependant variable: log of consumption 
 
First quartile robust regression estimates             Number of obs =    2471 
                                                       F(  7,  2463) =  245.30 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lchelt_cons  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lvenit_net |   .8103154   .0211361    38.34   0.000     .7688691    .8517618 
   pintr_fam |   .0116152   .0053621     2.17   0.030     .0011005    .0221299 
       mediu |  -.0802428   .0113688    -7.06   0.000     -.102536   -.0579496 
      varsta |    .001462   .0024796     0.59   0.556    -.0034004    .0063243 
     varsta2 |  -.0000292   .0000262    -1.11   0.266    -.0000807    .0000222 
        edu2 |   .0203598   .0121193     1.68   0.093    -.0034053    .0441248 
        edu3 |   .0832907   .0273008     3.05   0.002     .0297559    .1368256 







Second quartile robust regression estimates            Number of obs =    2471 
                                                       F(  7,  2463) =   40.99 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lchelt_cons  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lvenit_net |   .8072038   .0520152    15.52   0.000     .7052057    .9092019 
   pintr_fam |   .0175617   .0052981     3.31   0.001     .0071724    .0279509 
       mediu |  -.0653710   .0122768    -5.32   0.000    -.0894450   -.0412970 
      varsta |   .0013288   .0025866     0.51   0.607    -.0037433    .0064009 
     varsta2 |   -.000021   .0000259    -0.81   0.417    -.0000717    .0000297 
        edu2 |   .0021319   .0119918     0.18   0.859    -.0213831    .0256469 
        edu3 |   .0346612   .0209424     1.66   0.098    -.0064053    .0757277 




Third quartile robust regression estimates             Number of obs =    2471 
                                                       F(  7,  2463) =   34.73 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lchelt_cons  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lvenit_net |   .7348997   .0565763    12.99   0.000     .6239576    .8458418 
   pintr_fam |   .0195813   .0057731     3.39   0.001     .0082607    .0309019 
       mediu |  -.0694594   .0133632    -5.20   0.000    -.0956638   -.0432550 
      varsta |   .0076063   .0029332     2.59   0.010     .0018544    .0133581 
     varsta2 |  -.0000746   .0000291    -2.56   0.010    -.0001317   -.0000175 
        edu2 |   .0487408    .012566     3.88   0.000     .0240998    .0733818 
        edu3 |   .0504181   .0180065     2.80   0.005     .0151086    .0857275 




Fourth quartile robust regression estimates            Number of obs =    2471 
                                                       F(  7,  2463) =  146.69 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lchelt_cons  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lvenit_net |   .7188098   .0241215    29.80   0.000     .6715093    .7661103 
   pintr_fam |   .0272588   .0074035     3.68   0.000      .012741    .0417766 
       mediu |  -.0296547   .0090231    -3.29   0.001    -.0473485    -.011961 
      varsta |   .0028302   .0035733     0.79   0.428    -.0041768    .0098372 
     varsta2 |  -.0000228   .0000358    -0.64   0.524    -.0000929    .0000473 
        edu2 |   .0087709   .0176417     0.50   0.619    -.0258232     .043365 
        edu3 |   .0433525   .0189998     2.28   0.023     .0060954    .0806097 





The results show that the higher the income level, the lower the elasticity of 
consumption with respect to income. A possible explanation for this is that families 
save more as their income grows, since the consumption necessities grow slower than 
income, especially in the top half of the income distribution (households below the   19
median do not save or have negative savings). This explanation is supported by 
studies on household savings behaviour who find that families in the upper part of the 
income distribution have higher saving rates compared to families in the lower part 
(Harris et al (1999), Denizer et al. (2002)).  
 
 
Table 11. Elasticity of consumption by income quantiles, results 
  Elasticity  FT Gain (RON)  Amount Spent 
0-25% 81.0%  15.4  12.5 
25-50% 80.7%  33.5  27.0 
50-75% 73.5%  62.1  45.6 
75-100% 71.9%  159.4  114.61 
Total   270.4  199.8 
 
Table 11 summarizes the impact of income elasticity on flat tax gains: since the 
majority of the gains are concentrated in the fourth quartile, that elasticity has the 
biggest impact on the average: those families gaining, on average, almost 160 RON 
have spent 115 RON. We estimate that, on average, about 74 percent (199.8/270.4) of 
the flat tax gains went into consumption. 
 
Since much of the extra disposable income went into consumption, we would like to 
know if it went into durable goods. We look at the share of expenditures on durable 
goods in total consumption, as a function of flat tax gains. 
 






Durables  Share of total income 
1 2471  322  19.3% 
2 2471  365  8.8% 
3 2471  452  14.0% 
4 2471  518  17.1% 
 
Out of 9884 families with at least one employee survey, only 1657 (less than 17%) 
bought durable goods during the survey month. The nature of the survey (registering 
the family income and expenditures on a monthly, not yearly, basis) clearly 
underestimates both the number of familes who bought durables, and the amount 
spent. However, if the sample is representative, then we can safely conclude that the 
higher the flat tax gain (hence, the income), the higher the probability of spending on 
durable goods. As far as how much of the total income is spent on durables, the 
fraction appears to be increasing with flat tax gains (and income). The first quartile is 
again an exception, and the likely explanation is that (as we mentioned before) there 
may be significant income underreporting in this quatile, which leads to a higher share 
of income spent on durables. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
In this paper we focused on two research questions related to the flat tax impact on 
inequality in Romania. We compared 2005 against 2004, when we were able to isolate the 
flat tax impact from other factors.  
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First, how where the gains and losses from the flat tax distributed? We found that, the 
higher the gross wage, the higher the flat tax gains; and the higher the number of 
dependents, the lower the flat tax gains.  
 
The average monthly gain was 25 RON; 90% of the employees gained less than 50 RON. 
The flat tax gains were unevenly distributed: 10% of the total employees received 40% of 
the total flat tax gains. In relative terms, the average flat tax gain represented 3.73% of the 
net wage, while only 2% of the total employees gained more than 10% of their net wage.  
 
The inequality indicators we calculated (the Gini index, the relative mean deviation, the 
coeficient of variation, the standard deviation of logarithms, the Mehran index and the 
Piesch index) show an increase in inequality determined by the flat tax. The Lorenz curve 
is illustrative, as only the last quantile of the population (richest 20%) appears as the clear 
winner of the flat tax.  
 
Second, was the extra disposable income spent or saved? Our analysis was made at 
household (family) level, as individual data were not available for consumption behaviour.  
 
A tipical winning family from the flat tax has the following characteristics: is part of the 
top 20% in terms of the net income labour; 76% of the winning families heads graduated 
from high school at least (34% of them have college education); 83.5% live in the urban 
area; 48% of them do not have dependants (from the fiscal point of view); and – most 
importan – the average net income of the winning families is three times higher than the 
average net wage. 
 
The flat tax gains represent 3.3% of the total net income for the top half families in the  
income distribution and 2.4% for the bottom half. For only 1% of the families, the richest 
ones, the flat tax gains represent 10% of their total net income. Most of the flat tax gains 
were spent, instead of saved.. Our estimation is that on average 74% of the flat tax gains 
were spent on current consumption goods (the richest families spent 72%, the poorest 
families spent 81%). 
 
The results indicate that the higher the income level, the lower the income elasticity of 
consumption. One possible explanation is that the poorest families cannot afford to save as 
their income is barely enough to meet the basic needs, and once their income grows, they 
start saving a higher fraction of it.  
 
We recommend to replace the flat tax by a progressive tax, with two or three brackets, with 
large differences between them. This would reduce inequality, and would also leave more 
money to the poorest families, helping them also to access credits. 
 
In the current global economic crisis, there is a strong urge from governments’ side to 
increase revenues by, if possible, increasing fiscality. Particularly in countries with a flat 
tax, who found themselves in need of an emergency loan from the International Monetary 
Fund (such as Latvia and Romania), we recommend not to increase VAT, neither to 
increase the rate of the flat tax – these two measures would also increase inequality, but 
rather to replace the flat tax by a progressive tax system, serving two goals: increasing 
budget revenues and decreasing inequality. 
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Figure 1 (detail): Theoretical profit/loss (P/L) from flat tax, with a regressive 
allowance, 2005  
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